Ayesha Khalid Chaudhry
The war between Iran, Israel, and the US has made Tehran even more isolated from the rest of the world. As military tensions rise, sanctions pressure grows, and instability spreads in the region, an old question in regional politics comes back: where does Pakistan stand?
Islamabad's official stance has been clear but carefully calibrated. Pakistan condemned Israeli strikes on Iran as violations of sovereignty and international law. Ishaq Dar, the Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, called the attacks ‘unwarranted’ and asked for an immediate end to the violence. Pakistan has also offered to facilitate dialogue between Washington and Tehran, with Islamabad even discussed as a possible venue for talks.
But rhetoric should not be mistaken for alignment.
Iran is Pakistan's closest neighbour, with a 900-kilometer border. This makes stability along the Balochistan border a direct security issue. Domestic dynamics also matter. Pakistan has one of the largest Shia populations in the world. This often puts political pressure on the government to show diplomatic support for Iran during regional crises. These sensitivities were visible after the killing of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, which triggered protests in several Pakistani cities.
Yet Pakistan’s broader strategic and economic ties lie largely elsewhere. Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states remain key political and financial partners, hosting millions of Pakistani workers and providing vital economic support. Islamabad also depends on international financial institutions such as the IMF and maintains working relations with the United States. These realities place clear limits on how far Pakistan can move toward Tehran.
These constraints became more pronounced after the Pakistan-Saudi Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement (SMDA) signed in 2025. Although the full text of the agreement was never made public, official statements from both sides indicated that the pact commits the two countries to treat aggression against one as aggression against both. As discussed in my earlier SIGA analysis of the SMDA, the pact effectively anchored Pakistan within Gulf security dynamics and narrowed Islamabad’s room to manoeuvre between Riyadh and Tehran.
The current crisis has already shown what those limits are. Pakistan set up shuttle communications between Tehran and Riyadh after Iran asked for guarantees that Saudi Arabia would not be used as a base for attacks against it. The foreign minister said that those promises helped stop Iran from attacking Saudi Arabia more than other Gulf states. But if the conflict gets worse, Pakistan's strategy of keeping things in balance could be put to the test. The Saudi defence pact could put pressure on Pakistan to support the Saudis even militarily, while Pakistan would simultaneously seek to avoid direct confrontation with Iran along its western border. That caution is also shaped by Pakistan’s close partnership with China, which maintains ties with both Iran and the Gulf and has so far favoured de-escalation over direct alignment. A prolonged war would therefore complicate not only Pakistan’s relations with Tehran and Riyadh, but also the broader regional stability that matters to Beijing.
For now, Pakistan’s policy reflects cautious hedging. Islamabad voices diplomatic solidarity with Iran and criticises military escalation, but it avoids being drawn into the conflict or aligning firmly with either side. Rather than positioning itself in an anti- or pro-Western camp, Pakistan is trying to manage competing relationships with Iran, the Gulf states, China, and the United States. In practice, its priority is to prevent further regional escalation while preserving strategic flexibility.
Key Takeaways
- Pakistan condemned the Israeli attacks on Iran and called for an immediate de-escalation.
- Islamabad offered to facilitate US–Iran dialogue, with Pakistan discussed as a possible venue.
- Domestic factors, including Pakistan’s Shia population and protests after Khamenei’s killing, shape Islamabad’s diplomatic posture.
- Strategic ties with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, as well as economic dependence on IMF-linked financial structures and relations with the United States and China, constrain Pakistan’s room to align with Iran.
- The 2025 Pakistan-Saudi Strategic Mutual Defence Pact has narrowed Pakistan’s room to balance between Tehran and Riyadh.
- A wider regional escalation could force Pakistan into difficult choices between its Gulf commitments and stability on the Iranian border.