Lillybel Brägger
According to a national survey conducted by the Asahi Shimbun on March 14-15, 2026, 82% of Japanese do not support the Israeli-US attack on Iran. 53% of Japanese respondents feel “greatly anxious” about the economic impacts of the ongoing war in Iran, while 37% feel “somewhat anxious”. Only 9% of respondents backed the attack. As a main US ally and dependent, and a country 7,600 - 8,050 kilometres away from Iran, it may appear counterintuitive that the Japanese do not align with their primary security partner and express such deep unsettlement with a war occurring half a world away. But it doesn’t look so far-fetched considering what’s at stake for Japan.
What’s At Stake?
Already within the first three weeks of the conflict, there have been direct and immediate impacts on Japan’s energy, shipping and economy. Japan is deeply reliant on imports for over 85% of its energy consumption. These imports overwhelmingly come from the Middle East, which supplied 94% of Japanese crude oil imports, with 43% from the United Arab Emirates and 39% from Saudi Arabia. Since the 28th of February 2026, the Strait of Hormuz has been effectively closed, with a renewed complete closure announced on April 18-19 2026. This poses a severe threat to Japan, given that 93% of its oil imports can only pass through this singular route. An anonymous source interviewed by SIGA, who has worked closely with both the Japanese and US governments, warns that this vulnerability has raised fears of a crisis mirroring the 1970s oil shock, derailing an economy that has recently been performing relatively well. If Middle Eastern supplies are cut off by the war, Japan may need to turn to alternative, higher-priced oil from other sources, such as the US and Australia.
This pivot is already happening. On April 26 2026, a tanker carrying US crude arrived in Tokyo Bay, the first since the start of the war. Procured by Cosmo Energy, it provides approximately 145,000 kiloliters (covering about half a day of domestic consumption). However, transit fees through the Panama Canal have nearly tripled, as Asian countries scramble for American oil. Some last-minute auction slots have surged to $385,000 and one tanker payed a record $4 million for passage. Consequently, Japan has secured alternative routes in order to diversify, including a commitment from Saudi Arabia to supply crude via the Red Sea, and an agreement with Mexico to export 1 million barrels.
Aside from energy, the conflict is inflicting further economic pain as approximately 40 Japanese-linked vessels are stranded around the Persian Gulf. The cost of shipping has experienced a dramatic increase as a consequence of rising insurance coverage fees and chartering rates. Japan’s economy is already strained by high inflation and a weak yen, which has recently hit 20-month lows.
Consequently, this crisis will likely exacerbate existing internal debates concerning the expansion of nuclear energy, with the government seeking to maximise the use of nuclear power to meet growing demand, and the public’s resistance following the March 11 Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster in 2011.
Additionally, the conflict could serve as a test of Japan’s recent security reforms, allowing for limited collective self-defence. Although the United States has requested Japan’s participation in a maritime task force aimed at securing the Strait of Hormuz and assistance with missile production, there are significant legal hurdles preventing Japan from doing so, as it has not yet been designated a “survival-threatening situation”. Under growing pressure, Prime Minister Takaichi has expressed that there are currently no plans to deploy Self- Defence ships for escort missions, a stance reflected by 82% of Japanese voters who do not support the military action.
Japan’s Policies
As of yet, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi has remained vague on Japan’s official stance on the issue. While other countries have publicly condemned the attack for its violation of international law, Takaichi has remained cautious: “I will refrain from making a legal assessment”. The anonymous source explains that Japan’s foreign policy is inherently and inextricably bound to Washington’s, leaving Japan with no alternative stance. The source notes that Japan faces a stark choice: appease the US while attempting to stabilize its own economy, or oppose the US and cause far greater diplomatic and economic turmoil for itself. While the Prime Minister expressed her willingness to hold summit talks with Iran and has claimed that “We are preparing for dialogues at the leadership level at an appropriate time”, she failed to name the Iranian leader she considers holding these talks with.
Regardless of its unclear diplomatic stance, the administration has been forced to address immediate physical and economic threats. Although Japan has officially condemned Tehran’s de facto blockade of the Strait of Hormuz and its retaliatory attacks on neighbouring states, it has still attempted to maintain its historically amicable relations with Iran. Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi has continuously communicated directly with his Iranian counterpart, Abbas Araghchi, to promote de-escalation and try to ensure the safety of vessels in the Strait. However, the anonymous source describes these talks as essentially fruitless and largely for appearances. Although they discuss peace, Japan doesn’t possess
the geopolitical leverage to actually broker it. Tehran engages in them because Japan is one of the few nations still willing to converse with it, and Washington allows the diplomatic channel in case Japan may eventually serve as a future intermediary. Discussions with traditional allies seem to be far more fruitful in yielding concrete results. Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong, for instance, visited Japan in late April to discuss energy security, pledging that Australia will act as a reliable partner to prioritise diesel, petrol, and crucial fertiliser supplies to the region.
On March 11th 2026, Takaichi announced plans to mitigate the “economic toll” of rising fuel prices by using subsidies and releasing 80 million barrels of oil from the national stockpile. This release is equivalent to 45 days of domestic demand, and is a significant draw from Japan’s 470-million-barrel buffer. Although the government outwardly projects confidence by claiming to possess a year’s worth of oil reserves, the anonymous source clarifies that the real longevity remains uncertain. The claim is largely a psychological tool to prevent domestic panic. Acknowledging uncertainty would likely trigger hoarding and significantly inflate market prices. As of April 21, the domestic stockpile had fallen from eight months’ worth of consumption in March to approximately a seven months’ supply. Despite this, Takachi has verbally opposed urging the public to limit energy usage, arguing on April 27 that “economic or social activity should not be halted”. She further stated that the government will flexibly tap into the record 122.31 trillion yen fiscal budget before considering a supplementary one.
However, according to recent polling, much of the Japanese public is wary of how the government is handling the crisis. 51% of respondents disapprove of Takaichi’s politically cautious stance and reluctance to condemn the attack, while only 34% approve. Similarly, 43% of respondents voiced disapproval of Takaichi’s policies against rising prices, while only 38% approved. Despite these numbers, the anonymous source suggests that the decline in her approval ratings is not necessarily a cause for serious concern. Entering the war, Takaich’s approval ratings were much higher than the baseline approval of her predecessors, and a certain degree of political attrition was inevitable, considering the available policy choices.
Everyday Impacts
These impacts are already felt at the local, everyday level. The rising prices of crude oil are causing challenges for public bus operators in producing fuel, for instance. So much so that on April 9th, senior officials representing six different cities, including Kobe, Kyoto, and Nagoya, felt the need to visit the transport ministry to request an assurance for stable fuel supplies and financial assistance to public transport operators. According to Hisamoto Kizo, the mayor of Kobe, the prices of diesel in both Kobe and Kyoto have doubled, and local administrations lack the resources to resolve the problem by themselves.
For the average Japanese citizen, the effects of the war are likely felt directly at the gas pump. Since the beginning of the conflict, retail prices for regular gasoline have rapidly increased, reaching an average of approximately 175-180 yen per litre in many regions. Despite government interventions and the release of 80 million barrels from the national stockpile to mitigate panic, the underlying cost of crude oil remains high. Without the current subsidies, designed to create a threshold of a national average of 170 yen, economists estimate that local drivers would likely be facing prices well over 200 yen per litre. Still, Japanese firms are nearing the earnings season with a bleak outlook as high energy costs threaten a lasting and significant effect on consumer prices, regardless of future market fluctuations.
Farmers are similarly feeling the consequences of the conflict. Fertilisers crucial for agriculture (especially grain and vegetable production) are now over 50% more expensive than they were in February, and farmers expect them to become even more expensive in the future, even with Australia's recent promise to act as a reliable regional supplier. The agricultural ministry has found that the international prices for the key fertilizer ingredient urea have increased by over 50% from February to March 2026. If the cost of raw material remains this high, it is inevitable that fertiliser prices for this fall’s planting and beyond will continue to skyrocket. Senior Executive Vice President Omoto Hideki claims that “We will negotiate to prevent a blow to the production costs of farmers.” However, this promise doesn’t appear to be particularly promising, as even he admits that “it will be extremely difficult”.
Sources
Source 1: Japan arranging talks with Iranian leader as Middle East tension grows (The Mainichi, April 2026)https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20260406/p2g/00m/0na/015000c
Source 2: What Are the Implications of the Iran Conflict for Japan? (CSIS, March 20th, 2026)
https://www.csis.org/analysis/what-are-implications-iran-conflict-japan
Source 3: Iran war pushes Asia to think twice before doubling down on LNG (The Japan Times, April 17, 2026) https://www.japantimes.co.jp/business/2026/04/17/iran-war-lng-asia-rethink/
Source 4: Price surges caused by Iran conflict hit daily life in Japan (NHK Japan, March 13, 2026) https://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/en/news/20260331_B3/
Source 5: High oil prices force Japan equity analysts to slash forecasts (The Japan Times, April 13, 2026)
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/business/2026/04/13/high-oil-prices-japan-firms-forecast-down/?cx_testid=19&cx_testvariant=cx_undefined&cx_artpos=2&cx_experienceid=exuydivp65mv&cx_experienceactionid=showrecommendations1w47cwbjdpc561&cxtrackingid=%7bkpdx%7daaaap9tdnu_zawokyldpv1nkafhwahiqbw8zete4dg5lajllnmhucbomrvhvwurjvla2nu1wiiuxoddnntnvmdlzltawmdazn2n2n2nznzu1cwg5y28wbdg0ctmwkifzag93umvjb21tzw5kyxrpb25zmvc0n0nxqkpeuem1njfsenytbadwf3vwmwvrene1dlommtmzlje5lje2os4yygnkd2nol-arzwzwangy#cxrecs_s
Source 6: Survey: 82% of Japanese voters oppose U.S. attack on Iran (Asahi Shimbun, March 16, 2026) https://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/16424410
Source 7: South Korea and Japan on edge as US shifts military assets to Iran war (Nikkei Asia, April 14, 2026) https://asia.nikkei.com/politics/defense/south-korea-and-japan-on-edge-as-us-shifts-military-assets-to-iran-war
Professor, who wishes to stay ANONYMOUS (name known to the editorial staff)
Source 8: Tanker carrying U.S. oil arrives in Japan for 1st time since Iran war (Japantoday, 27 April, 2026) https://japantoday.com/category/national/tanker-carrying-u.s.-oil-arrives-in-japan-for-1st-time-since-iran-war
Source 9: Japan bathhouses in deep water as energy costs boil over (April 27th, 2026, Japantoday) https://japantoday.com/category/national/japan-bathhouses-in-deep-water-as-energy-costs-boil-over
Source 10: Australian foreign minister to raise energy security on Asia tour (27th April, 2026, Japantoday) https://japantoday.com/category/politics/australian-minister-to-raise-energy-security-on-asia-tour
Source 11: Japan, Saudi Arabia to agree to cooperate on alternative oil transport route (April 23rd, 2026, Japantoday) https://japantoday.com/category/politics/update1-japan-saudi-arabia-agree-to-cooperate-on-alternative-oil-transport-route
Source 12: Japan’s scramble for U.S. oil sends Panama Canal fees soaring (April 27, 2026, The Asahi Shimbun) https://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/16528277
Source 13: PM Takaichi opposes urging Japanese to save energy amid Middle East crisis (April 27, 2026, The Mainichi) https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20260427/p2g/00m/0na/023000c