This commentary builds on my earlier analysis of the Pakistan–Saudi Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement (SMDA), which explored how the pact has been framed and why it drew comparisons with NATO. That first piece looked at the language of ‘no exceptions, no limits’ and what it signals. Here, the focus shifts to consequences: what Pakistan stands to gain, the risks it may face, and why Saudi Arabia chose this moment to turn a long-standing partnership into a formal defence alliance.
For Saudi Arabia, the timing reflects both foreign scepticism and internal ambitions. Riyadh has seen a gradual increase in scepticism regarding the long-term reliability of American security. Trust has been eroded by years of disagreement over oil output, human rights, and the Gaza war, as well as the U.S. shift to Asia and the disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan. The 2019 Iranian missile and drone strikes against Aramco oil installations highlighted weaknesses that not even American forces could immediately address. Furthermore, the Kingdom has cause to question whether Washington will engage in a full fight due to the unpredictability of Israeli military operations in the area. Although Riyadh and Israel have mutual interests in countering Iran, it is alarmed by increased Israel’s aggression in the region. Riyadh condemned Israel’s recent strike in Doha and called it a criminal act. By securing Pakistan, the only Muslim nation with nuclear arms, Riyadh is establishing itself as a leader in the Islamic world, reducing dependence on the U.S., and supporting Vision 2030’s push for a domestic defence industry.
For Pakistan, the equation is more complicated. It brings both money and prestige. Saudi Arabia has historically been a vital source of financial help, offering oil on deferred payment, short-term loans, and investment pledges that have helped the economy stay afloat during repeated crises. Increasing Saudi involvement in Islamabad’s stability is a significant benefit at a period of IMF austerity and currency pressure. On the military side, Saudi funds could speed up procurement and modernisation, from submarines to joint air projects, and create room for defence-industrial cooperation. In addition to its practical value, the agreement also raises Pakistan’s profile. Pakistan is no longer just a trainer and manpower provider; it is now a treaty ally with deterrence responsibilities, a role usually held by major powers. That prestige matters both at home and abroad. Domestically, this strengthens the military’s narrative of indispensability at home and provides political leaders with a platform to demonstrate their international relevance. While internationally Islamabad can market itself as the security guarantor of the Muslim world. Defence Minister Khawaja Asif has even hinted that the pact could one day extend to other GCC states.
However, prestige frequently has a price. The greatest danger is becoming entangled in wars that have little bearing on Pakistan’s national interests. Most of Saudi Arabia’s security concerns are concentrated in the Gulf with Iran. Pakistan implicitly links its destiny to those battles by signing a mutual defence agreement framed as having ‘no exceptions.’ If tensions between Riyadh and Tehran worsen, Islamabad may be forced to take military or diplomatic action, which it has long attempted to avoid. Pakistan would now be obligated to formally commit, unlike in the past when it could respectfully refuse Saudi demands to participate in wars like the one in Yemen. This disrupts a fragile diplomatic balance. Islamabad has tried to maintain positive relations with Riyadh and Tehran for many years, hedging against taking sides. The tilt, however, is made very clear by the agreement. It’s unlikely that Iran will disregard it. Tehran can retaliate in a variety of ways due to its shared 900-kilometer boundary, including fomenting sectarian conflict among Pakistan’s Shia population and promoting insurgency in Baluchistan. The perception that Islamabad has sided with an anti-Iran front may spark internal instability in a nation where sectarian conflict has been a constant domestic issue.
Israel introduces another layer of tension. Pakistan has never recognized Israel, a position established by its founder, Muhammad Ali Jinnah and strengthened throughout many years of support for Palestine. As the only Muslim nuclear power, Pakistan has always been part of Israeli strategic thinking. SMDA makes that concern sharper. The idea that Islamabad would carry that deterrent into the Gulf will only heighten Tel Aviv’s anxieties. Therefore, Pakistan faces the risk of being included in Israel’s threat assessment not because of direct conflict, but because Israel’s own growing operations in the Gulf give the impression that it supports the opposition.
The most destabilising factor is probably added by India. New Delhi's economic and energy relations with Riyadh have grown over the last decade. That direction is undermined by the defence minister's unequivocal pledge that Saudi Arabia would support Pakistan in any conflict between India and Pakistan. India may now further deepen its own ties with Israel, the US, and France and counter Saudi support for Islamabad in future crises. This runs the risk of turning South Asian bilateral crises into triangular or even more expansive contests where the India-Pakistan rivalry and Gulf dynamics collide.
Finally, the military is already overextended along the Indian and Afghan borders, and the economy cannot support costly foreign commitments. Pakistan has previously experienced the high domestic costs of joining another nation's war, as demonstrated by the U.S.-led War on Terror following 9/11. Even if Saudi Arabia provided financial incentives, Islamabad would probably bear the brunt of any Gulf escalation. In contrast to loans, war cannot be paid back over time. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that Saudi aid will always align with Pakistan's requirements. Pakistani resources and blood might be used to support Saudi security, but the return could be less than expected.
The SMDA then offers Pakistan recognition and resources but also locks it into risks it has long tried to avoid. It is as much a test of Riyadh’s ambitions as it is of Islamabad’s capacity. The real question is not what the treaty says on paper, but how both sides will act when the first real crisis arrives.
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