Modi’s attendance at the SCO Summit in Tianjin underlined the boundaries of India’s agency within the U.S.–China–India triangle.
By Ayesha Khalid Chaudhry, SIGA Senior Fellow (Melbourne, Australien)
Though the 2025 SCO Summit in Tianjin is being touted yet another illustration of India’s strategic independence, the truth seems less like autonomy and more like structural entrapment. In the India–China–U.S. triangular dynamics, New Delhi’s movements are determined as much by choice as by constraint.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s attendance next Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin first appeared to represent balance: a handshake with Xi, a hug with Putin, and a message to Washington that India would not be limited to U.S.-led forums. Still, behind the optics lies vulnerability. U.S. tariffs have revealed India’s economic reliance, whereas Chinese infrastructure projects in South Asia keep undermining Indian influence. India’s SCO participation was accordingly more a hedging approach motivated by insecurity than a sure assertion.
The SCO itself revealed the limits of India. Modi’s warning that connectivity must respect sovereignty—a veiled reference to the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor—was a familiar refrain, but one that carries little weight inside an Institutions mostly under Moscow and Beijing’s sway. India can oppose, yet it cannot change the plan. Its voice is likely to be emblematic rather than decisive.
From Washington’s point of view, India’s involvement in Tianjin adds friction. The U.S. depends on India to confront China in the Indo-Pacific. However, when India sits at the same table as Xi and Putin, it undercuts the strategic narrative. From Beijing’s point of view, India’s involvement is tolerated but distrusted; it is seen as disruptive rather than as helpful. India therefore distances both poles: too cautious to comfort China and too unclear to satisfy the United States.
This is the paradox of India’s great-power ambition. Although it attempts to sway the strategic triangle, it is often pulled by its angles—economically constrained by the U.S., strategically challenged by China, and politically entangled with Russia. The Tianjin summit showed a state trying to convert structural weaknesses into agency rather than a spectacular swing power.
Ultimately, India’s involvement highlighted a harsh truth: in the changing architecture of U.S.–China competition, India may be visible but is still not conclusive.